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A B S T R A C TInformasi Artikel
This paper concerned with the empirical study about tax competition among 
regions which in a theoretical point of view, tax competition is seen as an 
economic policy strategy to attract mobile tax bases and firms in order to 
boost economic development in terms of employment and output growth 
within the political jurisdiction implementing it. Using a panel of more 
400 observed district and municipal in East Java. It provides empirical 
evidence on how the local tax as well as the retribution in the neighborhood 
affect the local tax. The results support the existence of fiscal externalities: 
an increase in the tax and retribution of local neighbors exerts a positive 
effect on the local tax which is shown by spatial weighting variable both tax 
and retribution. Several factors that are hypothesized affect local tax also 
significant to determine local tax, these factors such as original regional 
income, and regional domestic product as a proxy of income. 
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Introduction
 There are many questions around 
tax competition among neighboring ju-
risdictions have occupied economists for 
many years. Although early treatments of 
the issue were framed in the context of 
competition at the local level, it soon be-
came clear that the analysis could be ex-
tended to tax competition among regions 
and even among nations with barriers to 
mobility and levels of economic integra-
tion becoming increasingly relevant as one 
moved from the local to the national level.
 Early models of tax competition, de-
veloped by Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski (1986), were based on Oates’s 
(1972, p. 143) insight that, “In an attempt to 
keep taxes low to attract business invest-
ment, local officials may hold spending be-
low those levels for which marginal bene-
fits equal marginal cost.” The basic source 
of the inefficiency in these models has 
been called a “horizontal tax externality :” a 
rise in one region’s tax rate causes mobile 
capital to relocate to other regions, benefit-
ing them because their tax bases contain 
this capital. This view of tax competition 
is not without controversy. In particular, 
there is now a literature on welfare-im-
proving tax competition, much of it based 
on the notion that this competition leads 
governments to behave more efficiently 
than they would in its absence. See Wilson 
(1999) for a recent review of the various 
approaches to modeling tax competition.
 Such a relatively big discrepancy 
on business taxation between sub-national 
governments provides a framework where 
tax competition and reduction of the tax 
burden should, theoretically, attract (or re-
tain) firms within the jurisdiction implement-
ing this policy. This should promote local 
economic development in terms of employ-
ment and output growth. In the literature 
it is further argued that tax competition is 
‘good’ because: First, it limits public ex-
penditure and thus the local power, since 
it cuts back on the revenues accruing from 
business taxation and hence curbs govern-
ment spending; Second, it is an efficiency-
enhancing policy that forces the general 
government sector to strive towards an op-
timal resource allocation.
 Yet, some argue that tax competi-
tion is ‘bad’ because tax arrangements lead 
to the erosion of government revenues and 
may therefore put the sustainability of pub-
lic spending at stake. This paper focuses 
on another, neglected issue, namely, that 
the dynamics of tax competition between 
sub-national governments is such that a lo-
cal authority will not improve its relative po-
sition within the country and none will gain 
any long-lasting competitive advantages 
from such a policy, when considered from 
a closed-economy stance. In fact, when 
community a decides to cut corporate tax 
rates in order to gain a relative advantage 
on neighboring authorities, the latter will re-
taliate through decreasing their own taxa-
tion, so that any differential will be leveled 
out rapidly. In addition, the dynamics of 
tax competition between Indonesia sub 
national governments is such that all local 
authorities (district and municipal) could 
lose a part of their revenues from lower-
ing taxation. This form of competition may 
eventually impinge on the implementation 
of the required, or planned, fiscal policies 
at the sub national level, where govern-
ments may indulge in granting ad hoc tax 
advantages to particular firms and/or their 
managers. This is so much so when a 
balanced budget requirement is taken into 
account. This paper try to investigate the 
relationship tax among regions which their 
own neighborhood.
 The next section derives definition 
of tax competition and its externalities; we 
also try to explain about tax competition in 
prisoner dilemma in a stylized theoretical 
model. The third chapter describes the data 
available and a bit of its statistic description; 
mean and standard deviation. The impact 
of the neighborhood tax and also retribution 
revenue on the local tax and retribution was 
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modeled in the next section in the econo-
metric panel dynamic model with GLS 
technique. It yields a testable relationship 
between the local taxation, the tax both of 
district and municipal, and the retribution 
received by local government. The em-
pirical section investigates this relationship 
using a panel of spatial tax and retribution 
weighting. After presenting the results, the 
implications for the local tax policy and the 
role of the tax revenue are discussed, fol-
lowed by the conclusions in the section.
 
Literature Survey
Defining Tax Competition
 To investigate the empirical evi-
dence on tax competition, we first need a 
definition of tax competition. The literature 
on tax competition has devoted surprisingly 
little attention to defining this phenomenon. 
In some cases, tax competition seems to 
be defined very broadly as any form of non 
cooperative tax setting by independent 
governments.
 A somewhat narrower definition 
adds the requirement that each govern-
ment’s tax policy influences the alloca-
tion of tax revenue across government 
treasuries . This requirement eliminates a 
broad class of models known as “yardstick 
competition.” Rather than governments be-
ing linked through their treasuries, yardstick 
competition links them through the informa-
tional content of each other’s tax policies . 
In particular, a comparison between taxes 
in a given jurisdiction and those in a “simi-
lar” jurisdiction enables voters in the for-
mer jurisdiction to assess the performance 
of current government officials and vote 
accordingly. There is nothing in this story 
about interdependencies between govern-
ment budgets, and so we exclude it from 
this “broad definition” of tax competition.
 For our narrowest definition, we nar-
row the reasons for why government bud-
gets are interdependent. In particular, we 
define tax competition as non cooperative 
tax setting by independent governments, 
under which each government’s policy 
choices influence the allocation of a mobile 
tax base among “regions” represented by 
these governments. In particular, govern-
ments may compete over the allocation of 
workers, firms, capital, or shoppers. This 
definition eliminates “vertical tax compe-
tition,” where different levels of govern-
ments (e.g., federal, state, and local) im-
pose taxes on the same tax base. Rather, 
it encompasses the large class of models 
known as “horizontal tax competition,” un-
der which governments at the same level 
are competing. We refer to this definition 
as the “narrow definition,” or simply com-
petition for mobile factors.
 Our view is that the broadest defini-
tion encompasses too many phenomena to 
be of much interest. In fact, tax competition 
in this case would exist between two large 
trading economies that engage in tariff wars 
in an effort to manipulate their terms of trade 
in desirable ways. This is not what most 
researchers mean by “tax competition.”
 The broad definition seems over-
ly broad, too, if we are to view the label 
“tax competition” to carry much descrip-
tive power. In particular, in what sense are 
governments “competing” when engaged 
in yardstick competition? One answer is 
that they are competing over obtaining the 
informational advantages associated with 
being the low-tax region, but this seems 
quite different from competition over a mo-
bile tax base. The welfare implications are 
also very different. It can be argued that 
“yardstick competition” improves welfare 
by disciplining government officials.  On 
the other hand, it is widely thought that tax 
competition for mobile capital leads to inef-
ficiently low tax rates.
 Accordingly, the focus of this paper 
will on competition among independent 
governments over a mobile tax base. To 
keep the discussion manageable, we spe-
cifically focus on competition for mobile 
firms or factors (primarily capital), and do 
not deal with the sizable literature on com-
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modity tax competition or vertical tax com-
petition.
Tax Competition in a Prisoner’s Dilem-
ma Framework
 Tax competition may be considered 
as a regional (that is, cantonal) or local (i.e. 
communal) strategy implemented in order 
to ‘bid for firms’ (Wilson, 1999: 293–4). De-
centralized fiscal authorities may seek to 
attract, or to retain, within their territorial 
jurisdiction the most interesting business 
activities for a number of macroeconomic 
reasons – basically, to enhance regional 
economic growth and development, as 
well as to curb unemployment. The under-
lying idea is that tax cuts create conditions 
that eventually enlarge the tax base so that 
there will be a net fiscal gain at the end of 
the process. This rationale provides some 
arguments for tolerating, or even promot-
ing, tax competition between and within 
countries. From a theoretical perspective, 
the contention often raised in the literature 
is that tax competition constrains the Le-
viathan’s appetite for more State power 
and more public money (Pommerehne, 
1996; Feld, 1999). As a result, the general 
government sector is put under pressure 
to increase its public policies’ efficiency, 
because competing governments have to 
carry out their spending plans with less tax 
revenues. In fact, this strategy may also 
help a country, improve, or consolidate, its 
competitive ranking with respect to the rest 
of the world. For the national economy as 
a whole this may have a positive effect on 
employment and economic growth.
Dataset
 The dataset consists of the com-
plete set of communities in East Java re-
gions. It reports the revenues from taxes 
and another legal payment from the busi-
ness tax as well as the level of grants and 
population on an annual basis from 1995 
until 2005, which result more than 400 ob-
servations. These data were obtained from 
Central Bureau of Statistic ( Badan Pusat 
Statistik Jawa Timur) for East Java Re-
gions. In the period under investigation the 
business tax precisely consisted of a com-
bination of two taxes, one levied on busi-
ness earnings the other levied on business 
capital. As the definition of taxable business 
earnings not only includes profits but also 
a major part of interest payments, the tax 
on business earnings can be regarded as 
a capital income tax. Unfortunately the lo-
cal revenues derived from the two sources 
are not reported separately. Only at the 
national level information is available. Be-
cause of this problem we did not analyze 
kinds of sources tax separately. We use to-
tal tax revenue to proxy tax burden in each 
regions. In the table below, presented de-
scriptive statistic for each variable included 
in this paper. Table 1 shows us mean and 
variance each variable from the total ob-
servation and in the table 3.2 shows us 
mean and variance each region and each 
variable. From table 2 we can see that the 
highest mean dominated by urban areas 
such as kota Kediri and Surabaya. 
Tabel 1
Descriptive Statistic of Variables
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Econometric Model and Variable Defini-
tion
 The empirical model we introduce 
in this section closely follows the literature 
(Thiess Buettner, 2001) by including lag 
tax and spatial weighting scheme but in 
this paper we use common weighting tech-
nique in statistics. Tax rate and tax base on 
business sector as used by Thiess can not 
be applied in this time because the availa-
bility of the data and then it was replaced 
by the total aggregate taxes data. In this 
paper we try to include regional gross do-
mestic product (RGDP), retribution (RET), 
and deficit (DEF) between original regional 
incomes (PAD). Retribution and taxes de-
noted with bar represent the local neighbor-
hood using spatial weighting. The general 
econometric model we use as follows: 
Tabel 2
Descriptive Statistic of Variables in Each Region 1995-2005
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 Where TAX denoted the tax 
revenue as observed in region i in period 
t. DEF denoted regional budget deficit that 
can be obtained by computing differences 
between PAD (original regional income) 
and total expenditure in each region. RGDP 
denoted regional gross domestic product 
that reflects regional economic activity. wfi 
is the unobserved individual effect. Tax and 
retribution revenues denoted with a bar 
represent averages across the local neigh-
bor-hood using a spatial weighting scheme 
(see above). As tax rates are set in ad-
vance and grants only react with a time lag 
to the current revenues simultaneity might 
be less of problem. Nevertheless, all ex-
planatory variables on the right hand side 
are lagged, because the current tax obli-
gation depends on income in the previous 
year.
 The basic difficulty in estimating the 
influence of determinants of the business 
tax base is to ascertain a possibly lagged 
response in the tax base in the rather fluc-
tuating measure of the tax base available 
to this study. A full representation of the un-
derlying dynamics seems difficult given a 
dataset with observations for only 11 years. 
However, the recent literature on panel 
data estimation has developed procedures 
aimed at improving the quality of the em-
pirical representation of dynamic process-
es. In order to take account of unobserved 
heterogeneity individual effects should be 
allowed for, which-In the current context 
-would pick up the given locational charac-
teristics determining the attractiveness as 
a business location. They also pickup the 
basic cross sectional correlation between 
the jurisdictions (Case, 1991). Whereas 
the tax base of the business tax fluctuates 
with the business cycle the tax rates dis-
play a rather gradual trend. Therefore, it 
seems difficult to assume constant slope 
parameters, a{priori, and, it may be that 
even the variance of the cross{sectional 
distribution picked up by the individual ef-
fects is not constant over time.
Estimation Results
 In this section we discuss our main 
results. Table 3 reports the main GLS re-
gression results for model (1), using all 
observations for the period 1995-2005. In 
column (1) we note dependent variable 
which is Tax and dependent variables which 
are RGDP, PAD, RET, WTAX, WRET, and 
their first lag. While column (2) describes 
coefficients or parameters of independent 
variables, column (3) and (4) shows us er-
ror standard and P value. 
 Table 3 displays the results. It 
shows that the sum of the structural coef-
ficients generally has the expected sign 
but lag of each variable has opposite sign. 
The neighbors’ taxes have impact, which is 
significant in all years, indicating the pres-
ence of fiscal neighborhood externalities; 
this can be seen in the sign of WTAX and 
WRET variable but there is an opposite 
sign; WTAX has a positive sign and WRET 
has negative sign. In the other view, we 
see that the lag of WTAX has negative im-
pact in affecting tax. It can be understood 
as a reaction of the region which is caused 
taxation of their neighbors in previous year 
and it can be hypothesized asymmetric in-
formation occurs among regions. RGDP 
has positive impact on tax; it is well known 
in macro economic framework that income 
will increase tax revenue even though in 
the fixed tax rate. In the rule of summation 
of the parameter of each variable and its 
own lag (Σ), tax and retribution has a neg-
ative impact. It means that increasing tax 
burden in the neighborhood will decrease 
tax burden in each regions over 1995-2005.
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 The original regional income (PAD) 
has positive impact on tax revenue but its 
lag has negative impact. Tax revenue is 
main resource of PAD so that it is easy to 
understand why PAD has positive impact 
but the negative impact of PAD can be un-
derstood as increasing PAD in the previ-
ous year will attract the region to decreas-
ing tax income in the next year to give an 
incentive economic agent to gain on their 
business and live.
 Retribution (RET) has negative ef-
fect on taxes. Retribution is a kind of fiscal 
instrument which can not only substitute 
part of the role of tax but also as a comple-
ment of the tax. Current year retributions 
conduct as substitution as part of tax rev-
enue but the previous year of retribution 
conducts as complement. Regions will 
have targeted their income per year and if 
they can fulfill their target they will not at-
tract to increase the tax revenue and its re-
sources. 
 DEF significantly affect the tax. 
DEF reflects the lack of income and expen-
diture in each region. When DEF more 
than previous it will attract regions to try 
minimize their deficit even though central 
government give a help for this situation by 
general allocation fund for fiscal equaliza-
tion grant. But this grant will not make local 
government try to increase their regional 
income. Nowadays, DEF and PAD have 
been a pride of local government and as a 
symbol of local government achievement 
and performance
Conclusion
 This paper is the first to investigate 
whether there is tax and retribution exter-
nality or competition or not among regions 
in East Java except Batu. Tax Revenue 
and retribution were used as a proxy of 
burden to live and doing business in some 
regions in East Java. It can be predicted 
that the result will show significant impact 
of neighborhood fiscal policy such as tax 
and retribution. We found evidence of re-
gional tax competition among regions both 
district and municipal. The spatial impact 
indicators, those are WTAX and WRET af-
fect other regions which have spatial inter-
Tabel 3
Estimation Result
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action. In addition, we found that original 
regional income, deficit between original 
regional income and total expenditure, and 
also retribution have significant impact on 
tax.  
 On the theoretical framework, the 
lack of cooperation in direct taxation be-
tween sub national governments as well 
as tax competition is overall detrimental 
for the general government sector unless 
the goal of such a policy is to yoke the 
Leviathan. This kind of competition alters 
resource allocation and may reduce social 
welfare. Moreover, on the assumptions of 
unchanged policies and a balanced bud-
get requirement, any tax bonus granted to 
a firm (or to a targeted group of firms) is 
bound to be compensated by an increased 
tax burden for other firms or individuals. 
This compensation introduces a system of 
implicit grants that threaten fiscal justice. 
To avoid these shortcomings, two propos-
als may be put forward at the policy level, 
one concerning tax competition as such 
and the other addressing the problem of 
asymmetric information within that frame-
work. This attention to this problem need 
to be addressed and province government 
can do act coordination and maintain the 
productive competition among its territo-
ries.
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